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L INTRODUCTION 
My remarks will conclude the discussion of what the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 1 is and how it works. I am going to discuss 
the role of the SEC in interpreting and enforcing the Act. 
The SEC is actively involved in interpreting and enforcing 
the Act. Because the Act's bribery provisions are unlike most of 
the other provisions of federal securities law, one might wonder 
why the SEC has that role. In 1933 and 1934 there was some 
debate about whether or not the federal government should audit 
the books and records of corporations to determine whether their 
disclosures were accurate. Congress rejected the notion of 
auditing the corporations as an unwarranted intrusion into the 
private sector. The SEC has ever since been trying to gather that 
authority, and by taking an active role in interpreting and enforc-
ing the Act, the SEC has been able to assert some authority in 
that area. That intrusion has resulted in much kicking and scream-
ing in the corporate community. The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act suffers because lawyers are unable to decide precisely where 
lines are going to be drawn. Lawyers have quibbled over some 
very insignificant matters in the Act. Congress is now scrutinizing 
the Act, trying to get an overall sense of it. Those who must comp-
ly with the Act need to be able to predict how it will be inter-
preted. 
It is particularly necessary to have consistent interpretation 
and predictability in the regulatory area. If the Act confined itself 
to overseeing the keeping of accurate corporate books and 
records, there would be little controversy. However, the reach of 
the Act is not entirely clear, and the difficulty which corporations 
and businessmen experience when trying to comply with it has an 
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1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-104, 91 Stat. 
1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. V 1981)), reprinted in Ap-
pendix I, infra. 
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adverse impact on foreign commerce. In addition, the Commission 
has created restraints in the corporate accountability area, the 
corporate governance area, and the corporate perquisites area. 
From the early 1970s until the present, the Commission has 
sought to instill new values in the business community. Early in 
its involvement, during the Watergate period, the SEC discovered 
that there were slush funds in corporations. Watergate did for 
political and corporate power what Vietnam did for police actions: 
it brought them into our living room and gave them a bad name. 
We saw a line of rather seedy characters closely associated with 
the President of the United States, and we heard about bad people 
working for some of the largest corporations in the country. I 
think the public, whatever it may be, had its nose rubbed in the 
raw workings of power. The late 1970s experiences caused many 
people to distrust public fiduciaries. As a result, we created the 
Ethics in Government Act,2 which is a novel extension of law into 
a new field. We also created the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
which does to corporations what the Ethics in Government Act 
does for public fiduciaries. 
II. THE SEC'S ENFORCEMENT ROLE 
The SEC did not actively support the bribery provisions3 of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Indeed, it's not entirely clear 
that they have any interest in prohibiting bribery per se. Their in-
terest is making sure that disclosures are made to public in-
vestors, and in that respect, the SEC represents the public in-
terest. But to really understand how the SEC is affecting the 
public interest, we must examine what is meant by "the public in-
terest." What public is the SEC representing? There is a myth 
about widows and orphans who invest their life savings and equity 
securities in major corporations, and are at the mercy of the 
limited disclosure documents which corporations are forced to 
make in order to market their securities. There is a tug of war be-
tween how frank disclosures must be, and how to color negative in-
formation so as to still be able to sell securities when your sales 
are going down. The SEC is often balancing those conflicting no-
tions. The SEC's interpretation of questionable payments and how 
2. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 28 U.S.C.) (Supp. IV 1980). 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l, (Supp. V 1981). 
2
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1982], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol9/iss2/5
1982] Interpretive and Enforcement Program 275 
they must be disclosed under ~he federal securities laws is deter-
mined from an advocate's viewpoint-that these things must be 
disclosed for public investors because they are material to public 
investigations. There are some serious questions as to the validity 
of the different theories which the SEC has advanced to explain 
the materiality of these disclosures under traditional federal 
securities law and analysis. Some have said that the SEC uses the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to avoid having to test those 
theories in court under the existing antifraud reporting statutes. 
According to this view, the Commission looks to the accounting 
provisions4 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to carry the day 
for them. 
A. Beginnings: The Voluntary Disclosure Program 
Because of its vigorous enforcement program, the SEC was 
given authority by Congress to enforce the bribery provisions 
with respect to the public corporation which issues securities, and 
to enforce the accounting provisions which are applicable to those 
corporations. It was given this role because the Commission had 
already shown an interest in enforcement. The SEC had used the 
Watergate revelations as an excuse to start a so-called voluntary 
disclosure program. In effect, the SEC announced to corporations 
that they had to disclose what they were doing. If they came in 
voluntarily they would not have to disclose the names of countries 
or officials, but could instead make a generic report on a Form 8-K. 
If, however, they had to be forced to disclose, things would not go 
so nicely. Those corporations would be required to make public 
disclosures, and complaints would be filed in court. That was the 
giant club which the SEC wielded in the voluntary disclosure pro-
gram. 
In the voluntary disclosure program, and its general in-
vestigation efforts, the SEC has looked at well over five hundred 
American corporations. Congress knew when it placed enforce-
ment responsibility in the Commission that the agency would be a 
vigorous enforcement agency. That vigor has been exhibited, not 
in a large quantity of cases, but in the kinds of cases brought. 
They are carefully selected cases that have facts which support 
some of the very strained interpretations of the Act which the 
Commission advances. 
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981). 
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B. Selected Cases 
The first case prosecuted under the Act, SEC v. A minex 
Resources Corp., 5 was brought March 9, 1978, not long after the 
Act was passed. The SEC alleged misappropriation of assets. The 
misappropriations did not involve any foreign bribery scheme. 
Congress did not expressly provide for individual liability in the 
accounting provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. One 
would think, therefore, that these violations would be prosecuted 
under the reporting and antifraud provisions of the Federal 
Securities Act.6 The SEC, however, alleged aiding and abetting 
violations by the individual officer involved, and decided that 
these acts were, in fact, violations of the antifraud provisions. 
Thus, they preserved the notion that a violation of the accounting 
provision was also a violation of the antifraud provision, even 
though Congress was careful not to characterize them as such 
when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was passed. 
This very interesting first case contains a number of ag-
gressive interpretations of the Act. For example, A minex involv-
ed transactions which had occurred some time before the effective 
date of the Act. The Commission glossed over that point and alleg-
ed that, since the accounting provisions require a corporation to 
make and keep accurate records, by not correcting their books 
after the effective date of the act the corporation was maintaining 
false entries. The Commission also obtained disgorgement of the 
money which had been misappropriated, and it was returned to 
the corporation. Thus they established that, under the Act which 
did not provide any such express remedies, relief of that kind was 
available. Perhaps the most significant fact, however, was that the 
defendants consented to a judgment without litigating any aspect 
of the case. In fact, of the fourteen or so cases brought under the 
Act, none have involved an adjudicated decision by a court on any 
of the positions which the SEC has advanced. Some cases are still 
pending, but there have been no final decisions handed down. 
Most corporations would rather accept an injunction, return the 
money, and allow some other party the role of standing up to the 
SEC's interpretations in this area. 
5. SEC v. Aminex Resources Corp., No. 78-0410 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 9, 1978). Com-
plaint and temporary restraining order reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. 
REP. (CCH) , 96,352. 
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1976). 
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The second case brought by the SEC, one month later, was 
SEC v. Page Airways, Inc. 7 Although this case involved foreign 
bribes, the bribes occurred before the effective date of the Act. 
Because the SEC could not reach it under section 30-A, it turned 
once again to the accounting provisions. The theory remained the 
same: corporations had to correct their books and records to 
reflect the things done in the past which were not wrong at the 
time but are considered wrong under the Act. 
The third case, SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., 8 actually involv-
ed a violation which occurred after the effective date of the Act. 
The SEC had found that payments had been made before the ef-
fective date of the Act, but couldn't reach them under section 
30-A. However, in searching for violations the SEC found a con-
tract to make prohibited payments in the future. That was found 
to be a "promise to pay" under the Act, which was prohibited, 
even though no payments had been made under their contract 
after the effective date of the Act. The SEC decided that if a con-
tract were made where a party knew or had reason to know that 
proceeds would go to a high level government official, that con-
stituted a sufficient violation of the Act. 
That was not a bad start for the first three cases in the first 
year of the Act. It is true that the SEC has not brought many 
cases. It is a very small agency and has a rather large constituen-
cy that it has to police. But it is highly effective, and sends staff 
members out to conduct programs which advocate some of its 
more aggressive interpretations of the Act. The corporate com-
munity cannot sit back and wait and see how the law develops. 
Because it makes sound business sense to comply with federal 
regulatory authorities without a public clamor, corporations must 
conform their activity in ways which the agency requires. To do 
otherwise would mean that the corporations would be risking 
substantial litigation expenses and adverse publicity. 
The fourth case the Commission brought under the Act, SEC 
v. Marlene Industries, 9 was begun approximately a year after the 
Act was passed. This case resurrected the SEC's old campaign 
7. SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., No. 78-0656 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 12, 1978). Complaint 
reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,393. Subsequently, this 
case was transferred to the Western District of New York. See [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. 
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 96,717. 
8. SEC v. Katy Industries, Inc., No. C78-3176 (N.D. Ill. filed Aug. 30, 1978). 
9. SEC v. Marlene Industries, No. 79 Civ. 1959 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 16, 1979). 
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against unreported corporation perquisites for its officers and 
directors. In Marlene, two brothers, who served as officers and 
directors in the corporation, were paid sums from the corporate 
accounts for travel which never took place, and were allowed 
credit cards which apparently were not used for business pur-
poses. It was decided that these were violations of the accounting 
provisions. There was no foreign bribery involved; the SEC was 
once again intruding into the adequacy of records kept by a 
private corporation. 
C. The SEC Releases 
All of these cases held that the separate antifraud and report-
ing provisions of the federal securities laws had been violated, as 
well as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. At the same time that 
the SEC was waging this rather aggressive enforcement campaign, 
it was also actively disseminating its interpretations of the Act. 
The SEC issued a number of releases to guide the community. The 
first release under the Act announced that the SEC intended to 
make use of its new authority. 10 Approximately a year after the 
enactment, the Commission issued regulation 13B, its rules under 
the accounting provisions.11 These rules make it an offense to 
falsify records or to lie to your accountant. The Commission had 
initially proposed these very provisions to Congress as part of the 
Act. Although qongress rejected the provisions, the SEC took this 
new opportunity to secure the provisions by regulation. The 
validity of those regulations has neither been challenged nor ad-
judicated. 
In 1979 the Commission proposed the requirement that a cor-
poration must file, in its annual report, a statement by manage-
ment concerning the corporation's internal control systems.12 The 
purpose of that report, according to some, was to require a corpora-
tion to make affirmative disclosures about their internal account-
ing systems. Then, if those disclosures were false or misleading, 
they could themselves be grounds for an antifraud investigation. 
The Commission's initiative in this area was strongly resisted by 
10. Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 43 Fed. Reg. 
7752 (1978). 
11. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13(b)(2)(1)-(2) (1979). 
12. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 15772 (Apr. 30, 1979), [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) , 
82,063. 
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many corporations which were, at the same time, making volun-
tary disclosures. In 1980 the Commission withdrew its initiative, 
and it has never required a management statement on the internal 
accounting control system as a line item in Form 10-K.13 In 
January of this year, the SEC issued another ruling saying that 
the private sector initiatives in this area are sufficient.14 This is 
another example of the Commission using a club to get "voluntary" 
compliance from the corporation community. 
The Commission came under fire for both the bribery and the 
accounting provisions because it did not provide guidance by 
regulation, but relied instead upon individual complaints. Many 
people believed that this piecemeal approach was not a good way 
to proceed. The SEC was urged by some to adopt a program for 
reviewing proposed transactions similar to one run by the Justice 
Department.15 The Commission became concerned that this Act, 
particularly the antibribery provision, would have an adverse im-
pact upon business. The SEC requested information from anyone 
who was being adversely impacted. In 1980 a Securities Exchange 
Act Release requested comments about the manner in which cor-
porations were hurt doing business in foreign countries. 16 They 
issued another release several months later indicating that they 
had not heard from anybody. Consequently, the SEC would not 
have any program under section 30-A.17 The SEC said they would 
defer to the Department of Justice in determining whether to pro-
secute under the Act. 18 
Recently, the Commission issued a release which says that 
things are working well under the Justice Department programs. 
There have been a handful of letters from the Justice Department, 
13. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, 54 Fed. Reg. 40,134 
(1980). 
14. Statement of Management on Internal Accounting Control, Securities Exchange 
Act Release No. 34-18451 (Jan. 28, 1982), SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 220-1 Vol. 14, No. 5 
(Feb. 3, 1982). 
15. Department of Justice Review Procedure, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 
28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1980). See also Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
Review Procedure, 45 Fed. Reg. 20,800 (1980). 
16. Impact of the Antibribery Prohibitions in Section 30A of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16593 (Feb. 21, 1980), [1979-80 Transfer 
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 82,454. 
17. Statement of the Commission, Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 45 Fed. Reg. 59,001 (1980). 
18. Id. 
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but no floodgate of corruption. Consequently, the SEC will con-
tinue to defer to the Department of J ustice. 19 
A report of the General Accounting Office,20 gathered the em-
pirical data which the Commission had been unable to secure by 
the public comment process. It severely criticized the Department 
of Justice and the Commission for not providing guidance in the 
area of accounting. In response to this criticism, the then Chair-
man of the SEC, Harold Williams, drew some guidelines in a well-
publicized speech in January, 1981.21 The speech stated that the 
record-keeping provisions of the accounting section would apply to 
records which are relevant to the system of internal control. It did 
not concede that the records or the system were designed to pre-
vent foreign bribery, but it did concede that the records did not 
have to include every scrap of paper documenting every single 
transaction. For travel vouchers, all you need to have are the 
records which are relevant to the system of controls. And the 
system of controls, the SEC now tells us, need only be 
"reasonable." The SEC will defer to the reasonable business judg-
ment of a corporation in making a decision about the control 
necessary in a given circumstance for that corporation. 
In January, 1981, three years after the Act took effect, the 
Commission said that inadvertent accounting mistakes would not 
be subject to enforcement action by the SEC. They have maintain-
ed that reckless conduct suffices to violate the accounting provi-
sion, and have brought at least one enforcement action for alleged 
reckless conduct. 
If the SEC were to bring the enforcement action, it would be 
unlikely that they could obtain an injunction unless they were able 
to demonstrate that there was a reasonable likelihood that the 
conduct in question would be repeated. That has been the subject 
of much litigation under federal securities laws generally. 
Finally, the Commission has provided guidance concerning 
when and under what circumstances the conduct of subsidiaries 
19. Statement of Commission Policy Concerning Section 30A of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-18255 (Nov. 12, 1981), SEC. REG. 
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 629 (Nov. 18, 1981). 
20. Government Accounting Office, Impact of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on U.S. 
Business at 14-15 (Mar. 4, 1981). 
21. Statement of Policy on SEC Enforcement of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act's Ac-
counting Provisions, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,544 (1981) (address of SEC Chairman Harold M. 
Williams to the SEC Department Conference of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, Jan. 13, 1981). 
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will be attributed to the corporate parent. The SEC had long main-
tained that the sins of the subsidiary would be visited upon the 
parent. They have a rather elaborate structure for determining 
what level of sin, and what degree of control over the subsidiary 
are necessary. We now know that the books, records, and internal 
control systems of subsidiaries must comply with the Act. 
III. CONCLUSION 
During the past two years, the SEC appears to have taken a 
less aggressive stance in the enforcement and interpretation of 
the Act. This indicates that even independent regulatory agencies 
change in response to changes in the administration and changes 
in the political world. Since the Corporate Practices Act was pass-
ed there have been numerous changes in personnel. Among the 
new people are the director of the Division of Enforcement, the 
General Counsel, the Chairman, and four new commissioners. 
Thus, there are new people facing new interpretations. They have 
informed Congress that they are uninterested in bribery issues, 
which they are turning over to the Department of Justice. 22 It is 
unusual for the Commission to give up any authority, so that, in 
and of itself, is a startling development in the securities trade. 
They seem to be divorcing themselves, or trying to divorce 
themselves, from the raging controversy over whether or not it is 
a bad thing to bribe people in foreign lands to get business. 
They want to hold on, however, to the accounting provisions. 
I suspect they will vigorously pursue S. 708,23 which gives them 
precisely what they now have in the accounting area. If they can 
hold on to this accounting tool, I predict the SEC will maintain a 
lower profile in the area of the enforcement of foreign payments. 
The SEC will heed the Department of Justice in the bribery area 
but continue to vigorously assert its authority over all corpora-
tions under the accounting provisions. 
22. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act, Joint Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance and 
Monetary Policy of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 282, 288 (1981) (statement of John S.R. Shad, SEC Chairman). 
23. S. 708, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 13,983-85 (1981). These proposed 
changes to the FCPA are reprinted in Appendix II, infra. 
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